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The often-asserted relation of formal adequacy or elective affinity between 
capitalism and democracy is historically contingent on both sides of the relation. 
First, it holds for what Weber called “formally rational capitalism” – which is the 
form that Marx had previously investigated in Das Kapital –  rather than others, 
such as traditional commercial capitalism or politically oriented capitalism. 
Second, it holds only to the extent that “the comprehensive contradiction” 
identified by Marx at the heart of the democratic constitution can be resolved. This 
is the contradiction between a universal franchise that potentially gives subaltern 
classes control over legislative and executive powers and a constitution that 
protects property rights favourable to capital. These conditions are being 
undermined by the rise of new forms of political capitalism, especially finance-
dominated accumulation, that are facilitated in turn by the consolidation of 
neoliberalism; and by the consolidation of authoritarian statism, which involves 
the intensification of “exceptional” elements in a formally democratic shell, and 
the emergence of a permanent state of austerity. The article concludes with 
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1  On Capitalism and Democracy 
 
Advocates and critics of capitalism alike have long suggested that the liberal 
democratic republic “is the best possible political shell for capitalism” (Lenin 
1964, S. 398). More precisely, they seem to be claiming that liberal democracy is 
the formally adequate form of state in social formations in which rationally 
organized, profit-oriented, market-mediated accumulation provides not only the 
dominant principle of economic organization, but also of societal organization 
(Vergesellschaftungsprinzip). It is formally adequate because, when supported by 




effectively than when the state apparatus is openly controlled by the dominant 
classes (or class fractions) and/or is administered by state managers who use state 
power for self-enrichment. 
This claim may sound plausible in abstract terms (Paschukanis 2003; Fine 
1984). But it ignores the deeply contradictory and historically contingent nature of 
the relation between economic and political institutions in capitalist formations. 
Indeed, recent trends are once again making capitalist domination more visible due 
to the rise of finance-dominated accumulation and other forms of political 
capitalism. In making this claim, I distinguish finance-led from finance-dominated 
accumulation. Whereas the former is based on the increased importance of 
capitalist credit relations in the circuits of capital, the latter involves the dominance 
of interest-bearing capital within the wider social formation as well as in the 
circuits of capital. This is not the result of spontaneous market forces but of a series 
of political interventions and resort to extra-economic power (see below). Such 
developments are intensifying recent trends to authoritarian populism, 
authoritarian statism, and “post-democracy”. Moreover, in response, we observe 
various forms of popular reaction ranging from right-wing extremism through 
political apathy to radical left-wing populism or ecosocialism. 
Arguments for the formal adequacy and elective affinity of capitalism and 
liberal democracy tend to highlight and idealize specific accounts of capitalism 
and the state. On the one hand, the former is conventionally defined as a system of 
production based on, first, private ownership and control of the means of 
production and, second, wage labour. Restated in Weberian terms, it involves the 
formally rational organization of production based on the generalization of the 
commodity form to labour-power together with trade relations that are oriented to 
free markets (Weber 1968, S. 161-164; 2003, S. 272-273, 292-299, 373-374). 
Weber paid special attention to the conditions for the maximum formal rationality 
of capitalist accounting and also noted some of the ways in which it might be 
considered substantively irrational in economic and social terms. He also identified 
forms of “politically oriented capitalism” (Weber 1968, S. 161-164) that depend 
on various forms of extra-economic coercion and would seem to be less compatible 
with liberal democracy. I assess these issues below. 
In turn, liberal democracy is conventionally equated with a national territorial 
state based on the rule of law and universal franchise. Restated in Schumpeterian 
terms, liberal democracy involves intermittent, quasi-plebiscitary competition 
between circulating political elites for the votes of individual citizens (Schumpeter 
2005: 427-450; Weber 1994, S. 220-223). Defined in this minimal, elitist manner, 
democracy has survived or emerged in most post-war advanced capitalist states. 
However, if we include the institutional and socio-cultural prerequisites of 
effective democratic accountability, the situation looks less positive – for liberal 
democracy has specific legal preconditions. These include institutionalized 
political freedoms (e.g., freedom of association, freedom of speech, free elections), 
a competitive party system, the at least potential circulation into and out of 
government office of “natural” governing parties either alone or in coalition, 
parliamentary or equivalent control over the executive and state administration; 




opinion within the limits of the rule of law. Popular-democratic struggles aim to 
extend the sphere of validity of citizens’ rights, to include more of the population 
in the category of citizens, to institute the legal framework for creating and 
maintaining the social conditions and balance of forces that enable the people to 
monitor and safeguard these preconditions. 
The mutual relation between capitalism and democracy has so far been studied 
and rendered plausible mostly in terms of a synchronic formal isomorphism. 
Defenders of this claim have shown less interest in the historical trajectories of 
economic and political institutions and practices. Yet these trajectories show the 
contingency of that relation between capitalism and democracy and, where they 
co-exist, reveal its manifold structural contradictions, strategic dilemmas, and 
discursive paradoxes. These contingencies are summarized neatly in Stanley 
Moore’s aphorism that, “when exploitation takes the form of exchange, 
dictatorship tends to take the form of democracy” (1957, S. 85, ital. BJ). In short, 
the relation is not guaranteed. This invites further consideration of whether this 
relation is facing new challenges in the era of finance-dominated accumulation 
regimes operating in the shadow of neoliberalism and, if so, what this implies for 
the form of state and its role in securing economic exploitation and political 
domination. 
Accordingly, based on the definitions set out in this section, the rest of this 
article critically interrogates the claim that there is a formal correspondence or 
elective affinity between capitalism and democracy. Section two qualifies and 
expands on the definitions, noting the significance of political capitalism in capital 
accumulation, and then explores the historically contingent conditions in which 
this “fit” emerges and might prove stable. Section three extends this analysis by 
building on Marx’s analysis of the comprehensive contradiction in the bourgeois 
democratic constitution and outlining the significance of the institutional 
separation between the economic and political spheres as an important condition 
of relatively stable accumulation and bourgeois democracy – in large part because 
it constrains the forms of economic and political struggle to the advantage of 
capital. Section four suggests that, in the absence of these conditions, various 
political crisis emerge and, depending on the balance of forces, may lead to 
attempts to weaken or suspend the electoral principle that is crucial to liberal 
democracy and establish one or another form of “exceptional regime”. Section five 
introduces Poulantzas’s argument that “authoritarian statism” has become the 
“new normal” form of state and is characterized by the intensification of 
“exceptional elements” with a formally democratic political regime. Building on 
and updating this argument, section six posits that the increasing importance of 
finance-dominated accumulation facilitated by neoliberalization both undermines 
formally rational capitalism and intensifies the trend towards authoritarian statism. 
Section seven indicates how this transforms the comprehensive contradiction in 
the democratic constitution compared to the mid-19th century when Marx 
identified it. For the conflict between political restoration and social emancipation 
is being resolved in favour of capital rather than the subaltern classes. Section eight 




austerity to the consolidation of a state of permanent austerity. Finally, section nine 
provides some brief reflections on the prospects for social emancipation. 
 
 
2  “The best possible political shell”? 
 
The claim that democracy is the best possible political shell of capitalism depends 
on a formal isomorphism between formally rational capitalism and the form of the 
liberal democratic state. But it is clearly questionable on at least two grounds. First, 
formally rational capitalism is not the only basis of capital accumulation and other 
bases may be less compatible with liberal democracy. This is clearly the case with 
“primitive accumulation” and imperialism and, as we shall see, also holds for more 
recent forms of political capitalism. And, second, authoritarian rule that represses 
or otherwise restricts popular economic and political mobilization has been a 
crucial factor in capital accumulation. The literature on developmental states 
provides many examples. Political theorists note the potential disjunction between 
capitalism and democracy when they distinguish “normal” – that is, democratic – 
capitalist states from “exceptional” political regimes that abolish free elections in 
favour of executive authority (Poulantzas 1974). This indicates a need to explore 
the historical articulation of capitalist development and the modern state and the 
variability of capitalism and state forms. 
Regarding capitalism, the formally rational organization of production and 
continuous buying and selling on the market with free exchange (free trade) that 
corresponds formally to liberal democracy comprises only one of two modes of 
formally rational orientation to profit (Erwerb) that Max Weber identified from his 
historical studies of capitalist development (1968, S. 164f.). Note here that formal 
rationality involves numerical (here monetary) calculation about potential and 
actual profit-and-loss (1968, S. 85f.) and has no implications for the substantive 
rationality of capitalism, including economic, social, or, one might add, 
environmental, justice. The second formally rational mode involves trade and 
speculation on organized exchanges in graded or otherwise standardized 
commodities, securities, futures, initial public offerings of listed companies, and 
the financing of political bodies (1968, S. 164f.; 2003, S. 250, 295, 303, 311). 
Another mode identified by Weber comprises is traditional commercial capitalism 
based on trade and speculation in currencies, financial intermediation, and usury 
for production, trade, or consumption purposes, and the buying and selling of 
commodities. While some of these activities might seem to overlap with the 
preceding kind of orientation to profit, they do not benefit from the conditions for 
maximum formal rationality of calculation of opportunities for profit that exist in 
modern rational capitalism (Weber 2003, S. 370).1 
                                                  
1 Marx analysed formally rational capitalism in Das Kapital. It seems that he wanted to show that 
a mode of production characterized by “freedom, equality, property and Bentham” in the labour 
market (Marx 1972, S. 189) was fully compatible with economic exploitation, political 
domination, contradictions, and crisis-tendencies in the overall mode of production. Elsewhere, 




Weber also identified three ideal-typical, albeit internally heterogeneous, modes 
of “politically oriented capitalism” based on different forms of extra-economic 
coercion (Weber 1968, S. 166; following Swedberg 1998, S. 48-50, 172), I 
consider these as forms of political capitalism). These comprise, first, an 
orientation to predatory profit from political activities, including the financing of 
wars, revolutions, or party leaders; second, profits from continuous business 
activity based on force or a monopoly granted by political authority in the form of 
colonial property or fiscal revenues from tax farming or sale of offices; and, third, 
an “orientation to profit opportunities in unusual transactions with political bodies” 
(Weber 1968, S. 164-165; see also Weber 2003, S. 75f, 94-99, 278, 281-282, 296, 
300, 315f, 353f, 370; Swedberg 1996: 48-50). Weber’s analysis has an historical 
dimension. For, whereas the different forms of political capitalism and traditional 
commercial capitalism have long histories, formally rational capitalism can only 
become dominant and shape the dynamic of capital accumulation when economic 
activities are disembedded from traditional social relations and other spheres of 
society have undergone rationalization. 
Consistent with this interpretation (to be qualified below), several theorists have 
suggested the following periodization. First, the origins of capitalism in Western 
Europe were tied to mercantilism and absolutism and the top-down exercise of 
state power to promote primitive accumulation and establish the capital-labour 
relation. Second, with the consolidation of competitive capitalism in the first wave 
of capitalist economies, a liberal state secures the general conditions for 
accumulation to facilitate free market competition and intervenes when necessary 
to redress the effects of unfettered competition (e.g., factory legislation). This state 
is typically based on the rule of law and parliamentary representation of propertied 
interests. Extending legal and political rights and the franchise reinforces the 
illusion of equality among citizens to match the illusion of equality between buyers 
and sellers of labour-power. The commodity fetishism of free markets and the 
political fetishism of a constitutional state cannot ensure a stable fit between free 
markets and liberal democracy. Even so, as voters elect large numbers of social 
democratic and communist deputies, parliament is less able to arbitrate among 
competing capitalist interests and this task is therefore transferred to the executive. 
Third, as monopoly capitalism drives out liberal competitive capitalism and/or 
capital’s crisis-tendencies intensify, the state is pressured to intervene to renew 
accumulation, often at the cost of subaltern classes (vgl. Holloway and Picciotto 
1977; Mandel 1972; Gerstenberger 2011). Moreover, as Alexander Gerschenkron 
(1962) and others note, banks and the state had bigger roles in second-wave 
industrialization with the result that competitive capitalism was weaker, even 
where it existed, and political capitalism had a bigger role. This leads to a strong 
state with fewer opportunities for popular participation in policy formation. 
This simplified three-stage model holds mainly for first-wave capitalist 
economies, such as England, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the USA. Even these 
cases also involved political capitalism (e.g., the financing of wars, imperial 
conquest, colonialism, the slave trade and slavery, state-sponsored monopolies, 
                                                  
accumulation, Louis Bonaparte’s political regime, and so on. And he also showed explicitly or 




and forms of political corruption). In late development, the phases of mercantilism 
– with or without absolutism – and interventionism tend to be merged and liberal 
states are absent or ineffective. Examples include Bonapartism, Bismarckism and 
Tsarist autocracy. Similar points hold for East Asian developmental states and their 
successors in third-wave industrialization and for many post-socialist “transition” 
states, notably those that are resource-rich. As developmental states sought to 
catch-up with advanced economies through export-led growth, economic growth 
often relied on low-waged, labour-repressive primitive accumulation. 
Several important accounts also suggest that “authoritarian” forms of rule are 
characteristic of mature capitalism and not confined to periods of primitive 
accumulation, late development, or dependent and peripheral capitalisms. 
Examples include the ideas of first generation Frankfurt School theorists on trends 
towards a strong, bureaucratic state – whether authoritarian or totalitarian in form 
– in the context of economic crisis (Dubiel and Söllner 1973; Scheuerman 1996; 
and the essays in Scheuerman 2008). Early Frankfurt School theorists argued that 
this state form was linked to the rise of organized or state capitalism, which relied 
increasingly on the mass media for its ideological power and which either 
integrated the labour movement as a political support or smashed it as part of the 
consolidation of totalitarian rule. The theme of authoritarian rule was revived again 
following the end of the Second World War, especially in the context of the Cold 
War (associated with the rise of the National Security State) and the crisis of the 
post-war Atlantic Fordist mode of growth, which had combined rising prosperity 
with strong support for catchall parties and an expanding welfare state. 
This suggests that it would be mistaken to think that the political modes of 
securing profit belong to the past. Indeed, recognizing that they survive and may 
even be expanding, albeit in new as well as old forms, might lead one to different 
conclusions about the formal correspondence between capitalism and democracy. 
Indeed, one might well propose that, where political forms of profit-making are 
dominant, it is authoritarian rule that is the norm rather than the exception (Jessop 
2013, 2015c***).  
 
 
3. The comprehensive contradiction in bourgeois democracy 
 
This brief discussion of political capitalism and the accompanying historical 
summary indicate that the adequacy of the bourgeois democratic republic depends 
on the overall economic, political and ideological situation and its implications for 
the equilibrium of compromise necessary to the democratic constitution. Thus, 
commenting on the French constitution in 1850, Karl Marx noted an 
“comprehensive contradiction”: “The classes whose social slavery the constitution 
is to perpetuate, proletariat, peasantry, petty bourgeoisie, it puts in possession of 
political power through universal suffrage. And from the class whose old social 
power it sanctions, the bourgeoisie, it withdraws the political guarantees of this 
power. […] From the ones it demands that they should not go forward from 
political to social emancipation; from the others that they should not go back from 




This argument can be related to a common theme in analyses of the liberal 
democratic republic, namely, that the separation of the economic and political 
spheres limits the concentration of power to the mutual benefit of economic and 
political agents. Economic power can be used to prevent the abuse of political 
power, whereas political power can be used to counteract market failures. 
According to bourgeois apologists, where this separation exists competitive 
capitalism can expand through the smooth operation of market forces, whilst, in 
addition, dispersed economic power helps to block the abuse of political power. 
Milton Friedman (2004), a neoliberal ideologue, even claimed that an 
authoritarian capitalism was preferable to totalitarian communism because, at 
least, capitalism sustained economic freedom. Radical political economists and 
political theorists dispute this, however, arguing that competitive capitalism and 
liberal democracy are the twin supports of capitalist rule (Macpherson 1973, S. 
148–149). Both views can be related to Marx’s analysis of democracy. 
The comprehensive contradiction that he identified suggests that one crucial 
material basis for the reproduction of liberal democracy is the institutional 
separation between the economic and political in capitalist societies and its 
reflection in a clear demarcation between economic and political class struggle. 
For capital in general, the ideal position is one where class struggle is confined 
within the limits of the market relation and political class struggle occurs within 
those of bourgeois parliamentarism. Thus, subaltern classes should focus 
economically on improving or defending wages and conditions, politically on 
mobilizing public opinion and securing parliamentary majorities to advance or 
defend social reforms. Trade unions should not engage in strikes, especially 
general strikes, to support parliamentary or wider political action. Subaltern classes 
can participate in the political process on condition that they do not use their 
political (read electoral and parliamentary) power to challenge the social (read 
economic, political, and ideological) power of the dominant classes. Subaltern 
political action should be limited to influencing the “public” sphere and refrain 
from directly constraining the rights of private property, especially the allocation 
of capital to alternative investments and management of private enterprise. Where 
this kind of institutional separation is reproduced, subaltern classes find it hard to 
mobilize their full potential for defensive and offensive collective action. 
Moreover, where capitalism rests on equal exchange (trade in free markets and 
rationally-organized production) and the state’s revenues and credit-worthiness 
depend on taxes levied on private economic agents, the bourgeoisie has no need to 
control the state directly provided that the latter maintains the juridical, monetary, 
and other extra-economic conditions for accumulation and capital can engage in 
investment strikes or move capital abroad. 
Liberal democracy is significant here because it facilitates the disorganization 
of subaltern groups. Because individual citizenship is based on the formal equality 
of all adult members of society, their common interests are expected to cut across 
class antagonisms (Poulantzas 1973, 1978). Members of civil society are 
fragmented, even individuated, and the legally sovereign state is expected and 
empowered to define and promote the “national interest” and the “public good”. 




coercion, capital can offer political concessions (such as welfare state benefits) 
without threatening accumulation. The rise and expansion of the welfare state 
reinforces the potential mutual isolation of citizens as clients or consumers of 
distinct, multi-scalar public services. “The people” is thereby divided into 
heterogeneous client groups competing for state resources. 
Conversely, the dominant classes can enjoy their social power as long as they 
tolerate the short-term vagaries of democratic rule. Liberal democracy is 
advantageous here because it facilitates the organization of the power bloc because 
different fractions have the chance to bargain, compromise, and adjust their 
interests in ways that promote their long-term interests and, if possible, offer 
concessions to subaltern groups. As Antonio Gramsci noted (1993), this leads to 
struggles for hegemony (political, intellectual, and moral leadership) as dominant 
classes and their political allies develop economic strategies, state projects and 
hegemonic visions that reconcile, partially, the diverse interests of different 
economic, social, and other categories in an “illusory’ general interest. “Natural 
governing parties” have a key role here whenever they can reconcile the interests 
of a substantial part of the electorate and key sections or fractions of the dominant 
classes (Gamble 1973). 
In these conditions, universal suffrage, competing parties, the separation of 
powers, and parliamentary government all contribute to the flexibility of a political 
system which means that power can be continually readjusted to secure social 
cohesion. And, since the cohesion thereby secured is that of a class-divided 
society, this also maintains class domination. Indeed, workers’ struggles can 
sometimes impose policies that advance the long-term interests of capital. Two 
examples are 19th century factory legislation (Marx 1890, S. 503–582) and the 
Cold War class compromise that facilitated a virtuous circle of mass production 
and mass consumption in the Atlantic Fordist boom (Poulantzas 1973, 1975). 
This point can be linked to the administration of the modern state. This involves 
a formal separation between partisan politics oriented to struggles to define the 
(always illusory) national-popular will, and non-partisan administration that 
impartially implements political decisions. Whether or not this formal separation 
is effective is often hidden behind a cloak of official secrecy, intransparency, and 
control over information flows on a “need to know”–basis. In addition, 
bureaucratic domination separates citizens from direct control over the means of 
administration. This holds as much for economic intervention and welfare 
administration as for the means of coercion and repression and reproduces citizens’ 
dependency on efficient administration. 
The flexibility inscribed in the normal democratic state, especially through the 
turnover of political parties and coalitions, often provides the basis for crisis-
management or, at least, the ability for a fuite en avant, i.e., a continual game of 
blame, displacement, and renewed disappointment. However, there is no guarantee 
that the “comprehensive contradiction” can be managed in these or other ways. 
Political crises may occur where the institutional separation between economic and 
political struggles necessary to the smooth and legitimate functioning of liberal 
democracies breaks down (e.g., through a general strike with political objectives 




prerogatives). Likewise, they may emerge if the link between the economic and 
political spheres break down because economic or fisco-financial crises limit the 
scope for material concessions to subaltern groups, leading to greater reliance on 
passive revolution, corruption or coercion to secure political authority. Within the 
political sphere, crises can arise when the representational ties between major 
parties and their supporters are broken; when there is a crisis within the power 
bloc; when the institutional integration of the state dissolves, leading to incoherent 
or contradictory policies; when state intervention becomes ineffective, leading to 
a rationality crisis; when there is a loss of political legitimacy; when a crisis of 
hegemony emerges; or when, based on interaction among some or all of these 
crises,  an organic crisis of society eventually develops. 
Three common responses to such crisis of the state are: first, to reorganize the 
system of representation (especially its electoral aspects) to weaken the prospects 
of radical, popular-democratic or socialist governments. Second, to promote 
governments of national unity based on cooperation among the natural governing 
parties and the co-option or suspension of other parties. And, third, to limit the 
powers of parliament and elected officials by reinforcing the independence of key 
administrative apparatuses (e.g., central banks, the security apparatus) and/or 
declaring temporary states of economic or political emergency. Where such 
responses cannot be implemented or subsequently fail, attempts are often made to 
suspend or eliminate democratic institutions and resolve crises through an open 
“war of manoeuvre” that ignores constitutional niceties. This can lead to an 
exceptional regime that reorganizes state structures and the balance of forces – or 




4  Political Crisis, States of Emergency and Exceptional Regimes 
 
During periods of political crisis, the “comprehensive contradiction” of liberal 
democracy prompts open struggles between subaltern and dominant classes over 
the nature and ends of government. Notions such as Bonapartism and Caesarism 
were integral parts of 19th century European political discourse and provided a 
focus, alongside that of democracy, for exploring the relation between political 
authority and the popular will. This theme survived into the 20th century, especially 
during the interwar period around dictatorship and totalitarianism. On this basis 
some scholars, orthodox and heterodox alike, distinguish normal states and 
exceptional regimes in terms of conformity to democratic institutions and 
hegemonic class leadership. Normal states characterize conjunctures in which 
bourgeois hegemony is stable and secure, whereas exceptional regimes develop in 
response to crises of hegemony. Thus, while consent predominates over 
constitutionalized violence in normal states, exceptional states intensify physical 
repression and conduct an “open war” against dominated classes that ignores 




(cf. Gramsci 1971: S. 210-212, 179-185).2 
Poulantzas suggested that only one type of political crisis produces an 
exceptional political regime: namely, a crisis of hegemony within the power bloc. 
This occurs when no class or fraction can impose its “leadership” on other 
members of the power bloc, whether by its own political organizations or through 
the “parliamentary democratic” state. This is typically related to a general crisis of 
hegemony over the whole society. Such crises are reflected in the political scene 
and the state system. Symptoms include: a crisis of representation, attempts by 
various social forces to by-pass political parties and influence the state directly, 
and efforts by different state apparatuses to impose political order independently 
of decisions coming through formal channels of power. Such phenomena can 
undermine the institutional and class unity of the state even where it continues to 
function and provoke splits between top echelons in the state system and lower 
ranks. The state may also lose its monopoly of violence (see Poulantzas 1974, 
passim; 1976, S. 28). 
Faced with such political crises, the democratic rule typical of the normal state 
may be suspended and states of emergency or exceptional regimes introduced. This 
distinction between normal state and exceptional regime derives from the legal 
justification of states of emergency as being limited in duration until the crisis was 
overcome. For Poulantzas, it also reflected the European experience concerning 
the instability of most exceptional regimes. In this context, he identified five major 
contrasts between normal states and exceptional regimes:  
 
Table 1: Normal States and Exceptional Regimes 
 
Normal States Exceptional Regimes 
Liberal democracy with universal 
suffrage and formally free elections 
Suspend elections (except for 
plebiscites and referenda) 
Power is transferred between parties 
and/or governments in a stable way 
in line with rule of law 
No legal regulation of power 
transfer (“might is right”, state of 
exception, state of siege) 
                                                  
2 Related literature points to the possibility of more enduring forms of dictatorship. This is 
reflected in two recent lines of state-theoretical analysis: a soft thesis about the continuing decline 
of liberal democracy and a strong thesis about the irresistible rise of authoritarian statism 
(compare, for example, Crouch 2008 and Streeck 2013 with Poulantzas 1978, Bruff 2013, and 
Oberndorfer 2015; for further discussion, see below). Whereas the former thesis tends to focus 
on symptoms at the level of the political scene, the latter tends to ground its analysis in more 
fundamental shifts in contemporary capitalism and challenges to national security  – given that 
the national security apparatus links different apparatuses within the state, operates across its 
formal boundaries with society, and is itself linked through parallel power networks to important 




Pluralistic series of ideological 
apparatuses that operate relatively 
independently of the state 
Ideological apparatuses are 
integrated into the official state to 
legitimate its enhanced power 
Separation of powers Concentration of powers 
Power circulates organically, which 
facilitates a flexible reorganization 
of power 
These regimes congeal balance of 
forces existing at the time that an 
exceptional regime is introduced 
 
Source: based on Poulantzas 1974, 1976, and 1978 
 
Poulantzas’s analysis of how exceptional regimes congeal the balance of forces 
that prevailed when they are established echoes an earlier remark by Hannah 
Arendt. She noted that, once they have seized power, dictatorships tend to become 
routinized, predictable, and domesticated (1956, S. 407). The freezing of a given 
conjuncture makes it harder to resolve new crises and contradictions through 
routine and gradual policy adjustments and to secure a new equilibrium of 
compromise (Poulantzas 1974, 1976). In short, the alleged strength of an 
exceptional regime hides brittleness. Yet Poulantzas discerned important 
differences among exceptional regimes and was particularly impressed by the 
flexibility and manoeuvrability of fascism. In contrast, military dictatorship is the 
least flexible type; and Bonapartism is located halfway between these extremes 
(for further discussion, see Jessop 1985, S. 229-283). Arendt drew a similar 
distinction between dictatorships, which tended to stagnate, and totalitarian states, 
which, she claimed, were in a constant state movement, transgressing barriers, and 
engaged in permanent revolution (vgl. Canovan 2004). 
The relative rigidity of exceptional regimes is especially true, Poulantzas 
argued, where they lack specialized politico-ideological apparatuses to channel 
and control mass support and are thereby isolated from the masses. He illustrated 
this in terms of the contrast between the fascist regimes in Italy and Germany and 
military dictatorships. The latter are marked by a rigid apportionment of state 
power among distinct political clans linked to each apparatus. They have no 
ideology that can forge the necessary state unity and can establish an effective 
national-popular cohesion to forge state unity and national-popular cohesion. This 
produces a muddle of inconsistent policies toward the masses as the exceptional 
regime attempts to neutralize their opposition. It also leads to purely mechanical 
compromises, tactical alliances and settling of accounts of their “economic-
corporate” interests among the dominant classes and fractions. In turn this 
intensifies the internal contradictions of the state apparatus and reduces its 
flexibility in the face of economic and/or political crises (1976, S. 83 f.). This 
analysis was inspired by the collapse of the dictatorships in Greece, Portugal and 
Spain in the mid-1970s. The collapse of the socialist states in Central and Eastern 
Europe in the 1980s provides other examples. Thus, just as the movement from a 




taking a continuous, linear path, so the transition from an exceptional to a normal 
form will also involve a series of breaks and crises rather than a simple process of 
self-transformation. This places a premium on the political class struggle to 
achieve hegemony over the democratization process. 
 
 
4  From parliamentary democracy to authoritarian statism 
 
In the 1970s, Poulantzas described the “new normal” form of capitalist state as 
involving the “irresistible rise” of authoritarian statism. He argued that the 
capitalist type of state is now “permanently and structurally characterized by a 
peculiar sharpening of the generic elements of political crisis and state crisis” 
(1978: 206, italics in original). This reflected the long-term structural economic 
crisis of contemporary capitalism that was manifest in the 1970s and its reflection 
in a variety of political and ideological crises that were fracturing the social bases 
of the interventionist state, including the decomposition of the traditional alliance 
between the bourgeoisie and the old and new petty bourgeoisie, the growing 
militancy of rank-and-file trade unionists and other subaltern groups, the 
ideological crisis accompanying the growth of new social movements on erstwhile 
“secondary” fronts, and the sharpening of the contradictions within the power bloc 
because of the impact of internationalization on the relations between fractions of 
capital (1978, S. 210 ff., 219, 221). These symptoms reflect the crisis of Atlantic 
Fordism. But analogous symptoms can be seen in the export-oriented knowledge-
based economies and neo-liberal finance-of the 1990s and later. Thus, although 
Poulantzas’s account is marked by the conjuncture of the 1970s, it can be reworked 
for the rise of neo-liberalism in a far more integrated world market and its manifold 
crises in the current period. 
For Poulantzas, continuing the earlier metaphor, authoritarian statism had 
become “the best possible political shell for capital”. Political features that were 
previously exceptional and temporary were being normalized in this type of 
capitalist state. Its basic tendency is “intensified state control over every sphere of 
socio-economic life combined with radical decline of the institutions of political 
democracy and with draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called ‘formal 
liberties’” (1978, S. 203–204). He related this mainly to the state’s increasing 
assumption of economic functions as modified by the political situation to tame 
the “wilder” manifestations of capital’s crisis-tendencies – witness the Great 
Depression –, promote international competitiveness, and extend the profit-
oriented, market-mediated logic of capital accumulation into ever more spheres of 
social life (1978, S. 163-199). For, as the world market has become more 
integrated, its contradictions have been generalized and its crisis-tendencies have 
become more evident. This makes it harder to displace or defer crises, so they 
become a generally visible permanent feature of contemporary capitalism. Thus 
significant “exceptional” features are orchestrated into a permanent structure that 
runs parallel to the official state system and co-exists with and modifies the 




managed by the natural governing party or parties and the power centres inside the 
state apparatus. 
More specifically, drawing on several of Poulantzas’s analyses, “authoritarian 
statism” can be said to have six key features, with the exceptional features of 
authoritarian statism being articulated under the dominance of the normal 
elements. First, the crisis of hegemony means that the state administration becomes 
the central site at which the unstable equilibrium of compromise within the power 
bloc is elaborated. The legislative, executive, and judicial branches are 
increasingly fused, with real power being concentrated and centralized in the 
administration and sealed off from serious influence by parties and parliaments. 
Politics is now increasingly focused in and on the staff office of a president or 
prime minister. These leaders may appear to exercise despotic personal power but 
they more often serve as a charismatic figurehead who gives a sense of strategic 
direction in a complex, crisis-prone world. Personalism condenses many 
contradictory pressures and works to re-balance conflicting forces. Popular 
interests nonetheless still surface in the form of contradictions inside the 
administration (1978; cf. 1974, S. 311-314). 
Second, there is a decline in general, formal, and universal legal norms enacted 
by a parliament with a popular mandate that embodies the general will of the 
people-nation. Instead legal norms are set by the political executive and 
administration in response to particular conjunctures, situations, and interests and 
in consultation with business interests and associations – especially regarding 
economic intervention, broadly interpreted (Poulantzas 1978, S. 218–219; 
Scheuerman 2003). Likewise, as monopoly capital finds it hard to organize its 
hegemony through parties other than the dominant mass party or set of natural 
governing parties, it also relies on an expanded lobby system to influence the 
administration. Recent research on the US case shows that economic elites and 
organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent 
impacts on US government policy, while ordinary citizens and mass-based interest 
groups have little or no independent influence (Gilens and Page 2014; see also 
Ferguson 1995; Hacker and Pierson 2011). Exemplary here is the role of business 
lobbies, such as ALEC – the American Legislative Exchange Council, which 
prepares boilerplate model legislation for rolling out at state level in the US. More 
generally, one might add that their elaboration is increasingly delegated to non-
accountable private authorities at different scales up to and including the global 
(for example, Cutler 2009; McKeen-Edwards and Porter 2013). The decline of the 
rule of law also affects the political sphere. One sign of this is the increasing 
emphasis on pre-emptive policing of the potentially disloyal and deviant rather 
than the judicial punishment of clearly defined offences against the law 
(Poulantzas 1978, S. 219-220; Boukalas 2014). This is reflected in the increasing 
importance of the (national) security apparatus, the way its operations cross-cut 
formal bounds and boundaries within the state, and how it is linked through parallel 
power networks to important forces formally located beyond the state. Some of its 
strategies and tactics were pioneered in colonies, the (semi-)periphery, or occupied 




roll out the state with the result that “[t]he only way that terrorism affects our daily 
lives is through counterterrorism” (Boukalas 2014, S. 2). 
Third, the legislature becomes a mere electoral “registration chamber” with very 
limited powers and the state administration, guided by the political executive, 
becomes the main site for developing state policy. Concomitantly, fourth, the 
“natural parties of government” – in contrast to parties destined for a permanent 
oppositional role – no longer fulfil their traditional functions in policy-making by 
building compromises around a common programme or political legitimation 
through electoral competition for a national-popular mandate. Now their function 
is to transmit the state ideology to the popular masses, mobilize mass support for 
state policies in a plebiscitary fashion (Poulantzas 1978, S. 236f.; see also Blyth 
and Katz 2005). They engage in electoral manipulation based partly on cultivating 
close ties to the mass media, which promotes legitimation through a “populist 
ventriloquism” that speaks in the name of the “people” and thereby creates the 
public opinion to which politicians respond (Poulantzas 1978, S. 229; Hall et al., 
1978, S. 77ff., 125, 325). Political parties thereby lose their role as the leading 
channels for political dialogue with the administration and as the major forces in 
organizing hegemony and become transmission belts for official decisions and 
amplifiers of populist ventriloquism (Poulantzas 1978, S. 229 f., 237). This can 
occur in two ways: through a long period without alternation among the governing 
parties or through the development of a single inter-party ‘centre’ that dominates 
the alternating parties of power. 
Fifth, parties’ ties of representation to the power bloc become looser because 
monopoly capital finds it harder to organize its hegemony through parliamentary 
parties and concentrates its lobbying on the administration (1974; 1975; 1978: S. 
221-223). This further undermines the already limited involvement of the masses 
in political decision-making, severely weakens the organic functioning of the party 
system (even where a plurality of parties survives intact), and saps the vitality of 
democratic forms of political discourse. This makes it easier for the state to 
penetrate into all areas of social life – especially, one might add, where this is 
justified in the name of (national) security and a war on terrorism. 
Sixth, this massively politicizes the administration and risks its fragmentation 
behind a formal façade of bureaucratic hierarchy and unity (ibid 1978, S. 236). 
Accordingly, a “parallel power network” cross-cuts the formal divisions of the 
state and wields a decisive role behind the scenes on behalf of monopoly capital in 
coordinating official, semi-official, and “private” activities across various policy 
fields (Poulantzas 1974, 1978). With a strong anti-democratic ideology, these 
networks contribute to the evolving strategic line of the dominant mass party when 
it is in power and plays an obstructive role if a radical party wins office (Poulantzas 
1978, S. 203-240; for similar arguments, see Armin 2005; Greven 2010). 
The current Trump Administration illustrates some of these tendencies; but its 
actions to date seem inconsistent with others. The state administration remains the 
central site at which conflicts in the power bloc are expressed and there is a notable 
tightening of the ties to corporate America within and beyond Trump’s so-called 
“billionaires’ Cabinet”. Politics is also increasingly focused in and on the 




by historical standards, policy-making is often chaotic, prone to grand but 
ineffective and reversible gestures, including publicity-generating executive 
decisions that fall foul of remaining constitutional checks and balances, and lacks 
a sense of strategic direction. There is little strategic effort to secure support in 
Congress for Trump’s legislative proposals and/or reconcile the interests of 
conflicting capital fractions nationally and internationally. Moreover, rather than 
re-balancing conflicting social forces to secure social cohesion, Trump employs 
faux populism, alt-right social media, and dog whistle politics to maintain the 
support of his “base” at the same time as encouraging voter suppression against 
potential Democrat electors. 
This said, while there is no coherent positive strategy to reorganize the power 
bloc, a series of deliberately destructive steps is advancing the specific interests of 
different capital fractions, including his own family businesses. These steps 
include budget and staff cuts plus non-enforcement or deregulation in many 
regulatory agencies, the packing and “weaponizing” of courts, and removing the 
half-hearted restrictions and capital requirements on financial capital introduced 
by the Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection (or Dodd-Frank) Act after the 
2007–2008 financial crisis. Along with tax cuts and other largesse for corporations 
and ultra-high net worth families, these measures will entrench corporate power 
and privilege. At the same time there is further sabotaging of the welfare state in 
areas such as education, health, housing, social security, and other safety nets and 
attacks on labour rights. These policies reinforce austerity and require further 
entrenchment of the surveillance state, including, under Trump, intimidation of the 
mainstream mass media as purveyors of “fake news” and “enemies of the people”. 
Many measures coincide with the neo-conservative and neo-liberal agenda of 
billionaires such as the Koch brothers and as relayed through multiple lobbying 
groups. Key beneficiaries in the short- to medium-term are the fossil fuel 
industries, the military-industrial complex, and financial capital.While this 
summary may imply that Poulantzas believed that the “authoritarian statist” path 
runs smoothly, he stressed that state power continually runs up against limits 
inherent in its political matrix and operations, reflected in internal divisions and 
political resistance, as well as limits posed by the growing incompressibility of 
economic contradictions and crisis-tendencies and the challenges from new forms 
of popular struggle. Accordingly, he argued that this trend involves a paradoxical 
strengthening-weakening of the state. Muddling through, crises of crisis-
management, and pre-emptive policing of resistance are symptoms of the 
incompressibility of capital’s contradictions and the intensifying crisis-tendencies 
of an increasingly integrated world market (Poulantzas 1978, S. 241–247 and 
passim). The state must either allow economic crises to run their course or assume 
responsibility for managing them and displacing or deferring their effects without 
eliminating them. It is also much harder for the dominant fraction to sacrifice its 
short-term economic-corporate interests to promote its long-term political 
hegemony – especially in the absence of a competitive party system and in the face 
of the growing internationalization of capital, which limits the state’s temporal and 
territorial sovereignty. This creates problems of national unity that are especially 




1978, S. 213). Likewise, the state’s growing involvement in hitherto marginal 
areas of social life politicizes the popular masses and provokes new social 
movements. It is a state-form which results from the need of the state to combat 
economic and political crises – but it is also a form that generates crises and thereby 
creates the conditions for further extension of the security state. 
 
 
5  Finance-dominated accumulation 
 
The rise of finance-dominated accumulation extends and deepens forms of 
political capitalism in advanced post-war societies and leads to major changes in 
the circuits of capital as interest-bearing capital forms closer ties to the state 
apparatus – for neither neo-liberalism in general nor finance-dominated 
accumulation in particular is a spontaneous result of market forces. They are 
planned outcomes of political deal-making, corruption and “revolving doors”: an 
instance of relative fusion of economic and political power within the dominant 
classes. This, in turn, creates the conditions for accumulation based on force, 
predation and primitive accumulation and, when crises occur, rescue financial 
institutions that are too big, too systemically important, or just too well-connected 
to be allowed to fail and pass the costs to the “little people”. The resulting crisis of 
bourgeois political hegemony, whether based on claims to democratic legitimacy 
or on delivering growth and prosperity for all or most citizens, is nonetheless 
combined with a remarkable survival of bourgeois political as well as economic 
domination (Crouch 2011; Konings 2018). This paradox is related to the further 
extension of a “post-democratic” authoritarian statism. Capitalism’s elective 
affinity with liberal democracy is weakened when profits derived from financial 
speculation and risk-taking start to exceed those that come from the financial 
intermediation and risk-management activities that are essential to the circuits of 
productive capital. It is further weakened where finance-dominated accumulation 
leads to growing inequalities in income and wealth due to deregulation, 
liberalization, and the interpenetration of economic – especially financial – and 
political power. And it is even less sustainable when the dominant forms of 
orientation to profit depend on predatory political profits, including kleptocracy 
and primitive accumulation based on dispossession, profit on the market from 
force and domination, including use of state power to impose neo-liberal rules, 
institutions and practices on other accumulation regimes and open up new fields 
of accumulation, or “unusual deals with political authorities” – such as financial 
contributions for special legislative, administrative, judicial, fisco-financial or 
commercial decisions that privilege particular capitals and fall well outside the 
normal working of the rule of law. I leave aside here predatory capitalism 
associated with the conduct of “wars”, whether actual wars of conquest, plunder 
or colonization or metaphorical, ineffective but profitable “wars” on drugs, terror, 
and so on. 
For a while, some commentators held that the rise of “finance-led growth” 
following the crisis of “wage-led growth” linked to Fordism would facilitate 




clients to become sovereign-consumers. The Fordist wage relation was a key driver 
of the virtuous circle of mass production and mass consumption in relatively closed 
national economies. In contrast, the financialization of capitalist relations, 
including the wage relation, was supposed to enable workers to boost their incomes 
and wealth through home ownership, shares, funded private pensions, etc. 
(Aglietta and Rebérioux 2005; Boyer 2000). Some even believed that this “private 
Keynesianism” could replace the Keynesian national welfare state – but are less 
confident about this after the North Atlantic Financial Crisis (Crouch 2009). Well 
before this, however, other theorists already spoke of “finance-dominated 
accumulation” rather than “finance-led growth” in order to separate the empirical 
trend towards the autonomization of finance from the issue of whether it leads to 
growth, greater volatility, or stagnation (Stockhammer 2011, S. 3; see also van 
Treeck 2008). 
The disembedding of capital from the frictions of national power containers and 
national politics means that the law of value tends increasingly to operate globally 
by commensurating local conditions at the same time as it promotes the treadmill 
search for superprofits. Interest-bearing capital gains strongly from world market 
integration because it controls the most liquid, abstract, and generalized resource 
and because it has become the most integrated fraction of capital. Moreover, as the 
world market gets more integrated and the space of flows, including finance, grows 
more important relative to territorially-delimited economic activities, challenges 
mount to the territorial and temporal sovereignty of states, whether or not these are 
democratic in substance or form. 
As financialization expands and penetrates deeper into the social and natural 
world, it transforms the micro-, meso- and macro-dynamics of capitalist 
economies. Three basic manners of penetration can be distinguished. First, 
financialisation alters the calculations and behaviour of non-financial firms 
through the rise of shareholder value as a coercive discourse, technology of 
governance, and vector of competition. One aspect thereof is the growing 
importance for non-financial firms of financial activities that are not directly tied 
to their main profit-producing pursuits: for example, treasury functions, financial 
intermediation, using retained profits for share buybacks and/or acquisition or 
expansion of financial subsidiaries, etc. (Krippner 2005; Nölke 2009; Lapavitsas 
2013). Second, it boosts the size and influence of the financial sector. Fee-
producing and risk-taking activities increase relative to banking capital’s more 
traditional roles in intermediation and risk management – Deutsche Bank 
employees can write a book about it. Furthermore, securitization, leverage and 
shadow banking with corresponding liquidity risks and weak prudential controls 
expand, and so does the significance of new forms of financial capital like hedge 
funds, private equity, vulture capital and sovereign wealth funds. Third, as 
successive crises from the mid-1970s show, financialization makes the economy 
more prone to recession and, in severe cases, more liable to the downward spiral 
of debt-deflation-default dynamics (Dore 2008; Duménil and Lévy, 2005; Fine 
2010; Lapavitsas 2013; Rasmus 2010). Indeed, as more scandals emerge in the 
financial sector, it is becoming clear that these superprofits derive in part from 




measures of deregulation enacted thanks to the financing of political parties and 
political corruption (Smith 2010; Will u.a. 2013; Black 2015). 
The best possible political shell for such a regime, more noted for its absence 
than presence, would be an Ordo-liberal framework, as envisaged in the original 
Social Market Economy paradigm. This would provide a formally adequate 
institutional and spatio-temporal fix, including the embedding of neo-liberalism 
internationally in a new constitutionalism with credible commitments to corporate 
social responsibility. However, the neo-liberal bias towards de-regulation, which 
widened the space for financialization, was more often linked to an institutional 
fix that relied, and still relies, on “deals with political authorities”, predatory 
capitalism, and reckless speculation. These trends undermine the relation between 
free markets and democracy and have also fuelled the North Atlantic financial 
crisis. 
Because continued financialized expansion depends heavily on the pseudo-
validation of highly leveraged speculative and Ponzi debt, this regime contains its 
own inherent crisis-generating mechanism rooted in the systemic conflict between 
interest-bearing and profit-producing capital. Wolfram Elsner (2012) explains this 
as follows: Financial capital in this regime has a target rate of return that is several 
times greater than the historic norm for profit-producing capital and, worse still, 
striving to achieve this target, engages in massive leveraging of fictitious credit 
and capital. In aggregate, the eventual validation of this massively leveraged 
capital would demand a total volume of surplus-value that far exceeds the 
productive and exploitative capacity of existing profit-producing capital. Attempts 
to square this circle depend on three strategies that are individually and collectively 
unsustainable. 
One is to create and manage bubbles, the main redistribution mechanism in 
finance-dominated accumulation, and then bail out – or, rather: get bailed out – at 
the right moment (Elsner 2012, S. 146 f.). Rather than allowing market forces to 
discipline financial institutions through losses and bankruptcy, states have 
socialized losses, translating private debt into public and/or sovereign debt. This is 
impossible without the complicity of central banks and government in the finance-
dominated economies and those subject to their contagion effects. They have also 
taken direct responsibility for managing contagion effects in the always-already 
monetized “real economy”, albeit in the pro-cyclical, counterproductive form of 
private and public austerity. These measures have been pursued at national level 
by “natural governing parties” from the centre-left and centre-right as well as by 
more “technocratic” – that is, bank-friendly and non-accountable – regimes at the 
international, European, and some national levels. Indeed, the Federal Reserve, the 
Bank of England, and the European Troika, consisting of ECB, EU and IMF, 
asymmetrically defend too big to fail institutions, protect tax-avoiding, tax-
evading companies and wealthy elites, and impose the costs of crisis on the general 
population (Johnson 2009; Hudson 2011; Elsner 2012). This has involved virtual 
coups d’état in Greece and Italy and the more general fuelling of “deficit hysteria” 
to justify yet more neo-liberal policy measures in other indebted economies. Part 




but “boring” banking with financial speculation and risk-taking in the search for 
higher profits (LiPuma and Lee 2004; Haldane 2012; Elsner 2012). 
A second strategy is to invoke a system-threatening “financial emergency” that 
justifies efforts to reduce individual and social wages, impose internal devaluation, 
and privatize public services and assets to pay off the public debt incurred in 
massive bailouts. States at different sites and scales have key roles here too. In the 
era of finance-dominated accumulation, taming the wilder manifestations also 
means to “intervene periodically to underwrite the solvency of banks, to provide 
extraordinary liquidity and to guarantee the deposits of the public with banks” 
(Lapavitsas 2013, S. 27-28). 
The third strategy involves primitive accumulation through dispossession. 
Relevant techniques include land-grabbing, capitalizing nature and its services 
enclosing the intellectual commons, privatizing accumulated public wealth, 
colonizing the residual public sector, and so on. This is also impossible without 
state involvement. In short, the most rarefied and leveraged forms of fictitious 
credit and capital are now primarily, and systemically rather than merely 
contingently, problem-makers – and the rest of the economy, society and nature 
are the problem-takers. 
 
 
6  The Challenges of Political Restoration and Social Emancipation 
 
The form of the current democratic crisis differs from that envisaged in Marx’s 
comments on the fundamental contradiction in the democratic constitution. What 
is being restored politically as well as socially are not the privileges of some 
national Ancien Régime. Instead, we are seeing the political consolidation of a new 
transnational power bloc organized around interest-bearing capital. This bloc’s 
survival depends heavily on Weber’s three forms of political capitalism. The 
longer it survives, the more it damages the nature, state of political emergency that 
is now being constructed will continue as the “political shell” for a predatory, 
finance-dominated accumulation regime even if, and when, the financial crisis is 
resolved. 
Contrary to widespread assumptions of a fundamental contradiction between 
market forces and the state, this “new normal” regime both strengthens and 
weakens state power. On the one hand, resort to bailouts and quantitative easing 
that rely on the state’s role as lender of last resort and its monopoly of taxation do 
indicate the limited powers of the state to tame the effects of crisis and, thanks to 
the influence of financial interests, to introduce reforms that would present its 
resurgence. On the other hand, the unprecedented fisco-financial measures have 
failed to resolve the underlying contradictions and crisis-tendencies of finance-
dominated accumulation and there is a palpable crisis of crisis-management in 
many states and international agencies. One sign of this is the growing split 
between the exit strategies proposed by profit-producing capital and the policies 
favoured by those identified with the more fantastical, irrational forms of interest-




In total, the neo-liberal project has produced crises on three levels, that are now 
shaking the pillars of Western societies: first, and most visible, a representational 
crisis as the electorate grows more detached from stable alignments with natural 
governing parties. Second, and more latent, a legitimacy crisis in several countries, 
following from the failure to deliver sustainable finance-led growth and the costs 
associated with crisis-management. Third, but not least, a crisis of intellectual and 
moral leadership associated with outright deception, official secrecy, populist 
rhetoric, and media spin. An initial response to the crisis in neo-liberal attempts to 
promote “more market, less state” was, and is, growing resort to flanking and 
supporting measures to keep the neo-liberal show on the road. This was reflected 
in, inter alia, the discourse and policies of the “Third Way” or “Neue Mitte”, which 
sought to maintain the course of neo-liberalization in new circumstances. 
Furthermore, as neo-liberal, “Third Way”, or more recent austerity policies 
begin to bite, there is growing, if still fragmented, resistance and growing anger 
about economic and political linkages among interest-bearing capital, politicians, 
and state managers. The best-known expressions of this resentment were for a 
while the Occupy Movement with its slogan of the 99% the 1% and the Astro-turf 
“Tea Party” movement in the USA. The latter is now mainstreamed in the 
Republican Party under Trump and has been absorbed into Trump’s “base”. But 
there are many other grass-roots manifestations in, for example, Greece, Spain, 
and Italy and many commentators have related the “Arab Spring” to the impact of 
neo-liberal policies and financialization in the Middle East and North Africa. But 
these movements mostly operate at a distance from the state, changing the 
calculations of economic and political elites, but lacking access to the real levers 
of power in the circuits of capital, the inner sanctums of national and supranational 
state authorities, and the international agencies that exercise decisive private 
authority in the world market. Indeed, as one aspect of authoritarian statism, 
popular movements far removed from any conventional definition of terrorism are 
now targeted as if they were terrorist organizations. Anti-war, Occupy, 
environmental and animal rights movements are affected, while journalists and 
individual dissenters confront suspicion, surveillance, and intimidation (Boukalas 
2014). It remains to see whether the many fragmented forms of resistance can be 
linked up horizontally, vertically, and transversally to provide an effective 
challenge to this new bloc, its finance-dominated accumulation regime and its 
“new normal” state form by exploiting their fragilities. This will require 
connecting economic and political power in ways that are “proscribed” by the 
democratic rules of the game but are realized continually in non-democratic ways 
by the new transnational financial bloc. 
Overall, this reconfiguration of the state and governance in response to recent 
economic and political crises goes beyond the trends discussed in the 1920s and 
1930s or the 1970s and 1980s. Nonetheless these trends towards authoritarian 
statism have made it easier for capital to address the crisis of finance-dominated 
accumulation. It provides important precedents for the de facto declaration of a 
state of economic emergency that has justified both the use of exceptional powers 
to rescue insolvent financial institutions, rather than to nationalize them or allow 




a state of political emergency that justifies increased surveillance, pre-emptive 
policing, and paramilitary suppression of dissent. Even if there is a return to 
“financial business as usual” and interest-bearing capital has been fully restored 
socially, political restoration of democratic rule will not be volunteered by the 
financial oligarchy. It must be seized back from below. 
 
 
7  Towards an Enduring Austerity State 
 
In spite of sharing a common gestalt, austerity policies differ in their concrete 
shape. That’s not only due to ”varieties of capitalism”, reflecting their specific 
economic profiles and imaginaries: they are also shaped by interdependencies that 
result from interstate relations, including forms of regional and global governance, 
foreign trade plus other features of world market integration, and the prevailing 
logic of the world market. This highlights the need to examine austerity in terms 
of the relations between the economic and political fields, including their basic 
forms and institutional architecture, and their mediation through the changing 
balance of forces. 
The well-known policy-politics-polity triplet suggests that austerity can be 
studied in three ways. First, there are conjunctural austerity policies that are 
introduced in the first instance as temporary measures in response to short-term or 
immediate problems. As the conjuncture becomes favourable again, these policies 
are suspended or reversed. Second, there is the enduring politics of austerity, often 
called “permanent austerity” in the relevant literature” that is promoted in response 
to a “chronic” crisis, real or manufactured, in the fisco-financial domain and/or in 
the economy more generally. This enduring politics of austerity, as noted above, 
is intended to bring about a more lasting reorganization of the balance of forces in 
favour of capital rather than to make policy adjustments to safeguard existing 
economic and political arrangements. Third, there is the austerity polity. This 
results from a continuing fundamental institutional reorganization of the relations 
between the economic and political in capitalist formations. It can be a possibly 
unintended cumulative result of the enduring politics of austerity, especially where 
this aggravates the underlying causes of fisco-financial crisis. But it can also result 
from a deliberate strategy to subordinate the polity more directly and durably to 
the “imperatives” of the world market as these are construed in neoliberal 
discourse with its one-sided emphasis on the logic of exchange-value. And, given 
the political, ideological, hegemonic, and organic crises that have developed in the 
context of the financial, economic, and fisco-financial crises, they can also be an 
authoritarian response to growing popular unrest – including right-wing extremism 
– about the technocratic and plutocratic nature of crisis responses. 
Whereas conjunctural policies are found in the pattern of neoliberal policy 
adjustment and associated with targeted cuts in specific areas, an enduring politics 
of austerity is characteristic of neoliberal regime shifts and assumes the form of 
general fisco-financial restraint, putting downward pressure on most areas of 
expenditure, especially discretionary ones (Pierson 2001; Ferrera 2008; Seymour 




emergency or, even, in lasting states of exception. It can be triggered by an obvious 
crisis, one that is deliberately exaggerated, or one “manufactured” for political 
purposes. Indeed, in neoliberal regimes, whatever the state of the economy, it 
seems that it is always the right time to reduce public expenditure – except for 
corporate welfare – through an appropriately crafted and crafty politics of austerity. 
This involves far more than quantitative cuts in spending because it is also intended 
to have qualitative, transformative effects. It is pursued as a means to consolidate 
and extend the power of capital, especially interest-bearing capital, and to subsume 
ever wider areas of social life under the logic of differential accumulation. It 
becomes a major vector of the colonization, commodification, and, eventually, 
financialization of everyday life – processes subject to friction, resistance, and 
crisis-tendencies. 
Over the past decade, similar ideas have been developed by other critical 
commentators, from the right as well as the centre and left, especially in the context 
of the recent and continuing financial crisis and its broader economic 
repercussions. For example, Greg Albo and Carlo Fanelli (2014) refer to a new 
phase of bipartisan or pluripartisan “disciplinary democracy” as the political form 
of “permanent austerity” (Rasmus 2010; Stützle 2013). Ian Bruff refers to neo-
liberal authoritarian constitutionalism (Bruff 2013), Ingar Solty (2013) identifies 
an authoritarian crisis constitutionalism oriented to the economic governance of 
competitive austerity, and Lukas Oberndorfer describes the development of 
authoritarian competitive statism (2015). From a social democratic perspective, 
Wolfgang Streeck refers to a move from the welfare state to the consolidation state 
(2014). And a (former) Fabian Socialist, Colin Crouch, describes the transition to 
post-democracy (2008). On the libertarian right, there is condemnation of the 
strong and repressive state that emerges from allegedly unconstitutional 
intervention to shore up finance capital and police dissent (e.g. Stockman 2013). 
Such claims prompt the question whether these are short-term aberrations, 
conjunctural states of emergency, or precursors of a “new normal’. 
Seymour (2014) explains this well. He argues that austerity involves something 
much broader and more complex than spending cuts – thanks to its role in 
restructuring, recalibrating, and reorienting state expenditure. Indeed, for him, 
austerity is the dominant political articulation of the global economic crisis in 
Europe and North America. According to him, this strategy has seven aspects: first, 
to rebalance the economy from wage-led to finance-led growth; second, to 
redistribute income from wage-earners to capital; third, promote ‘precarity’ in all 
areas of life as a disciplinary mechanism and means to reinforce the 
financialization of everyday life; fourth, to recompose social classes, with growing 
inequality in income and wealth and greater stratification within classes; fifth, to 
facilitate the penetration of the state by corporations; sixth, to accelerate the turn 
from a Keynesian welfare state based on shared citizenship rights to a workfare 
regime that relies on coercion, casual sadism, and, especially in the US, penality; 
and, seventh, to promote the values of hierarchy and competitiveness (Seymour 
2014, S. 2-4). In many respects, these aspects were already inscribed in the politics 
of neoliberal regime shifts but, for Seymour, they were reinforced after the 2007-




the painful measures already taken to consolidate budgets in the 1990s and early 
2000s were wiped out by the impact of the North Atlantic Financial Crisis and the 
Eurozone crisis as governments took on more debt to bail out banks and/or create 
stimulus packages (Rasmus 2010; Hudson 2012). 
This ramping up of the politics of austerity occurred in part because the response 
of financial capital to this crisis intensified the state’s fisco-financial crisis. 
Measures were taken to rescue interest-bearing capital from the effects of its Ponzi 
dynamic and from the inherently unsustainable drive for financial profits (see 
above; Demirović & Sablowski 2013). This created a debt-default-deflation 
dynamic that has worsened public finances as well as the private sector (Rasmus 
2010). In addition, as Seymour, among others, notes, the politics of permanent 
austerity is not just a response to economic crisis but also to political and 
ideological crises and, indeed, an organic crisis of the capitalist social order 
(Seymour 2014, S. 4; Gramsci 1971; Bruff 2013). This is used to justify a state of 
economic emergency that is presented initially as a “temporary” response to 
immediate or chronic problems, but then acquires more permanent form through 
cumulative and mutually reinforcing institutional change, routinization of 
exceptional measures, and habituation. 
The politics of austerity can therefore be interpreted as a long-term strategic 
offensive to reorganize the institutional matrix and balance of forces in favour of 
capital. It aims to rearticulate relations between both the social power of money as 
capital, respectively of capital as property on the one hand and the political power 
of the state on the other. Inter alia, this involves a politics aimed at disorganizing 
subaltern classes and reorganizing the capitalist power bloc around interest-
bearing capital in neoliberal regimes and export-based profit-producing capital in 
economies where neoliberal policy adjustments prevailed. In the Eurozone, for 
example, the central goal of authoritarian crisis constitutionalism is to deepen EU 
integration on neoliberal terms and govern through competitive austerity. Its aims 
include socializing bank losses, exploiting the sovereign debt crisis to restructure 
welfare states and labour markets – including further measures to weaken trade 
union bargaining power – and to impose shock therapy in the periphery. In both 
finance-dominated and export-oriented regimes, the overall approach can switch 
between offensive and defensive tactics. An example of the latter is the ‘Third 
Way’, with its flanking and supporting mechanisms to maintain the overall 
momentum of neoliberal transformation. The successful pursuit of this strategy, 
which cannot be taken for granted, leads to an austerity state embedded in a 
political system that institutionalizes a ‘permanent’ politics of austerity. 
As shown above, much of this was already revealed by Poulantzas when the 
current era of capitalist crises was only looming on the horizon. Writing in the 
mid-1970s, though, he largely neglected the development of authoritarian statist 
tendencies at the transnational level. Developments here involve scale-jumping for 
capital coordinated through parallel power networks and oriented to securing the 
conditions for a “new constitutionalism” (Gill 1995) that provides super-protection 
for capital as neoliberalism is rolled out globally and limits the territorial and 
temporal sovereignty of national states. The secret negotiations between national 




Consensus international economic institutions around the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TTP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
are an extreme example of this trend. They aim to re-scale quasi-constitutional 
protections for capitalist enterprises and their activities to the international level – 
thereby removing them from the more contentious field of national politics –, to 
allocate adjudication over disputes, including with states, to private tribunals, 
experts, lawyers, and other ostensibly non-political forums and/or figures, and, 
surprisingly (or not) in allegedly democratic regimes, to limit the power of elected 
governments to introduce legislation or administrative rules that would harm the 
anticipated profits of transnational enterprises. 
The growing popular hostility to TPP and TTIP as details leak into the public 
domain is one illustration of the limits of the power of the transnational deep state. 
Another is the growing concern among economic and political elites about the 
backlash from growing inequalities of wealth and income and the obvious bias in 
favour of financial capital in managing the North Atlantic financial crisis and the 
Eurozone crisis. Thus, the rise of “authoritarian statism” involves a paradox. While 
it clearly strengthens state power at the expense of liberal representative 
democracy, it also weakens its capacities to secure bourgeois hegemony (1978, S. 
241, 263 ff.; Bruff 2014). 
 
 
9  Conclusions 
 
Drawing on the work of Marx, Gramsci, and especially Poulantzas, I have argued 
that the relation of formal adequacy between capitalism and democracy is limited 
to what Weber calls “rational capitalism” and depends on the temporary, 
provisional resolution of the “comprehensive contradiction” at the heart of the 
democratic constitution. The approach developed above emphasizes the need for 
political analysis to consider state forms, political regimes, political discourses, 
and the changing balance of political forces as well as basic economic relations, 
economic crises, and the economic conjuncture. This supports three claims about 
the historically contingent nature of the relation between capitalism and 
democracy. First, finance-dominated accumulation is associated with new forms 
of political capitalism that facilitated its rise, enable its expansion, and intervene 
to resolve its crises in the interests of financial capital. Second, the institutional 
separation of the economic and political spheres that characterized liberal 
democracy is in decline and leads to the intensification of “exceptional” elements 
of the state as dominant fractions of capital and state managers seek to address the 
crisis-tendencies of finance-dominated accumulation and resistance to 
neoliberalization. Third, these trends are connected with the neoliberal politics of 
austerity and the rise of the austerity state. Overall, this suggests that the subaltern 
classes have lost the battle to prevent the political restoration of capitalist 
domination. Whether they can reverse this and engage in a war for social 
emancipation remains to be seen. 
The preceding arguments indicate three areas for further theoretical reflection 




accumulation as opposed to financialization more generally. This has several 
aspects: the limits to the continued expansion of fictitious credit, fictitious capital, 
and fictitious profits at the expense of profit-producing capital3 and the growing 
indebtedness of workers and households as real wages stagnate; the diminishing 
room for manoeuvre of financial authorities when the next financial crisis erupts, 
especially as the concentration of interest-bearing capital has intensified after the 
North Atlantic financial crisis; the declining competitiveness of finance-dominated 
economies relative to economies where profit-producing capital remains dominant 
– notably in some Rhenish capitalist economies and China, with its 2025 
technology plan; and the rise of right-wing and left-wing populism among social 
categories that are real or perceived losers from finance-dominated accumulation 
and neoliberalization more generally. 
The second area for further theoretical work concerns the limits to the 
permanent austerity state as the current form of authoritarian statism. There is a 
risk here that the response to the next major financial crisis will be increased 
austerity unless it is not managed like the last major crisis to rescue interest-bearing 
capital at the expense of other fractions and the subaltern classes. There are crucial 
current and future limits to further intensifying austerity. For, given market 
failures, the bias of neoliberalization to profit-maximization to the neglect of 
substantive negative externalities across different aspects of the capital relation 
and wider social formation (on which, see Jessop 2012), and growing disaffection 
with austerity and its social consequences, further austerity, especially if it is 
intended to socialize the losses of capital, will reinforce the backlash against the 
austerity state. The political challenge regarding the failures of finance-dominated 
accumulation and the limits of further austerity is how to counteract the rise of 
right-wing populism and mobilize resistance towards projects of social 
emancipation oriented to human flourishing and environmental justice. 
The third area is more political but should rest on theoretically-informed 
conjunctural analysis. It concerns the forms, stakes, sites, and social bases of 
resistance to the trends explored above. Here we should first note that resistance is 
not reactive but is an important driving mechanism behind the emergence and 
changing character of all three trends. This applies especially to neoliberalization, 
which emerged in part in response to conflictual crises of Atlantic Fordism, state 
socialism, and import-substitution industrialization and which changes shape as it 
“fails forward” (Peck 2010, S. 6) and encounters new forms of resistance 
(Featherstone 2015). Finance-dominated accumulation in turn could mobilize 
resistance from larger profit-producing and commercial capitals, small and 
medium enterprises, and subaltern groups exploited through usury and facing 
mounting indebtedness and stagnant wages. And the permanent austerity state, 
with its “exceptional” elements, is a response to the intertwined constraints of the 
neoliberal privatization of profits and socialization of losses (especially for 
predatory financial capital), neglect of the material and institutional conditions of 
existence of profitable accumulation at the expense of short-term profit 
                                                  
3 This can be seen in, inter alia, the use of profits and tax breaks to buy back shares rather than invest in 
research and innovation to maintain competitiveness; this is a form of self-cannibalization of profit-




maximization, and growing but fragmented resistance to austerity and exclusion. 
The respective crises and struggles in each case are quite heterogeneous, with 
different symptoms and results for different social forces and social categories in 
different contexts, and do not and cannot generate a homogeneous response. The 
complex symptomatology of crises creates multiple challenges over how to define 
the symptoms, construe their underlying causes, and translate these diagnoses into 
remedial or palliative actions and, worse, if they are misdiagnosed, actions that 
aggravate or intensify underlying causes and symptoms (on the challenges of 
symptomatology, see Jessop 2015b). So far, the right in various guises has 
managed to interpret the multiple, heterogeneous, and interconnected crises of 
neoliberalization, finance-dominated accumulation, and enduring austerity state in 
terms favourable to capital and/or right-wing populism that disorganizes the left. 
As yet, then, the political restoration of capitalist domination in neoliberal regimes 
has not created the conditions for social mobilization oriented to the social 
emancipation of subaltern classes and groups. New ecological, economic, political 
and social imaginaries that can construe the intensifying crises are crucial here. 
Whether they can be developed through connecting grass-roots resistance across 
different territories, places, scales, and networks and building on local experiences 
or through broader initiatives aimed at building political, intellectual, and moral 
leadership through more encompassing political parties and social movements 
remains the key strategic dilemma for organizing resistance. The challenge is how 
best to develop new forms of social organization – or an ecology of organizations 
– that can address both horns of this dilemma. This is not the topic for another 
scientific paper but for actually existing and potential social movements. 
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